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1. Introduction 
On 27 August 2013, an incident in the district of Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh, ostensibly lit the 
largest outburst of communal violence in India since the 2002 violence in Gujarat. In just a few weeks’ 
time, the communal tensions led to the death of at least 52 people (15 Hindus and 37 Muslims), the 
displacement of an estimated 50,000 people around the town of Muzaffarnagar, and about 30 children 
that subsequently frose to death in the refugee camps (Berenschot, 2014, p. 15). 
 The incident that triggered the Muzaffarnagar riots remains disputed, and therefore has several 
narratives. Nevertheless, the incident got a communal colour, and led to the death of one Muslim and 
two Hindu Jat farmers. Despite the long-standing tradition of economic interdependence between 
Muslims and Hindu Jat farmers in the region, the communal tensions increased further as politicians 
from both communities started spreading rumours and delivering inflammatory speeches in order to 
mobilise their communities. Since the state government did not respond adequately to the emerging 
situation, mass violence erupted, which spread to neighbouring districts as well (Muralidharan, 2014, 
p. 41; Ahmed, 2013, p. 10; Berenschot, 2014, p. 15). 
 The media and many scholars (e.g. Brass, 1997 & 2003; Wilkinson, 2004) have ascribed 
India’s communal violence predominantly to instrumentalist explanations. These explanations argue 
that politicians and their parties derive electoral benefits from either instigating or preventing 
communal violence in order to change the salience of ethnic identities (e.g. caste, religion, language), 
depending on a calculation of the potential win or loss of votes. These electoral incentives for 
communal violence would explain the variation in patterns of violence within states (Wilkinson, 2004, 
p. 4-8). This argument has also become the dominant explanation for the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots 
(Berenschot, 2011b, p. 26-29). 
 Despite the obvious relevance of the instrumentalist argument, it falls short in explaining how 
and why some towns and villages are more prone to polarising strategies of politicians than others. 
Additional theory is needed to mitigate this weakness, and to gain a deeper understanding of the 
dynamics of India’s recent Hindu-Muslim violence. This study therefore uses Varshney’s (2001 & 
2002) theory of civil society, which argues that there is an integral link between the structure of civic 
life in a multi-ethnic society and the presence or absence of ethnic violence. Strong intercommunal 
engagement would seriously constrain politicians in their attempts to polarise people along ethnic lines. 
Conversely, merely intracommunal engagement and weak or non-existent intercommunal engagement 
would make civil society more prone to politicians’ attempts to instigate communal violence 
(Varshney, 2001, p. 362-363). 
By using Varshney’s (2001 & 2002) theory to explain the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots, this study 
attempts to gain insight into the link between the structure of civic life and the presence or absence of 
communal violence in the towns and villages in the Muzaffarnagar district. The 2013 Muzaffarnagar 
riots arguably make the most significant and deplorable recent case of India’s communal violence, 
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located in an area known for its long-standing tradition of intercommunal economic interdependence, 
and remains to be underexplored academically. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the 
dynamics of Hindu-Muslim violence in contemporary India, more insights into the 2013 
Muzaffarnagar riots are needed. The following research question has therefore been formulated: 
 
What effects did intercommunal engagement have on the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots? 
 
This study conducts qualitative research on the case of the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots, using 
Wilkinson’s (2004) instrumentalist theory of electoral incentives as a starting point, and Varshney’s 
(2001 & 2002) theory of civil society as the main explanation for the within case variation, in order to 
be able to look beyond the prevailing explanation for India’s communal violence. 
 This thesis is structured as follows. Firstly, a literature review, the main theoretical 
assumptions, the definitions of core concepts, and the hypothesis are discussed in the theoretical 
framework. Secondly, the case selection, the method of analysis, the operationalisation of the 
hypothesis and its variables, and the collection of data are justified in the methodology section. 
Thirdly, a description of the case, the research results, and its implications for the theory are addressed 
in the analysis. Lastly, the main findings, weaknesses, alternative explanations, and suggestions for 
future avenues for research are presented in the conclusion. 
2. Theoretical framework 
The literature on communal violence and civic engagement is wide, yet it only dates from the last few 
decades. The main theories on this subject are discussed below in the literature review in order to 
provide an overview of the available building blocks for this study. Subsequently, several building 
blocks are combined to formulate the thesis’ main theoretical argument as deemed relevant for the 
explanation of the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots. 
2.1 Literature review 
Studies by Horowitz (1985 & 2001) form the basis of the literature on communal violence. He defines 
a deadly ethnic riot as ‘’an intense, sudden, though not necessarily wholly unplanned, lethal attack by 
civilian members of one ethnic group on civilian members of another ethnic group, the victims chosen 
because of their group membership’’ (Horowitz, 2001, p. 1). In this definition, ethnicity can be 
conceived as either ‘communal’, ‘racial’, ‘religious’, ‘linguistic’, or ‘tribal’ (Horowitz, 2001, p. 1). 
This has become the prevailing definition for communal violence in the academic literature. 
 In The Deadly Ethnic Riot (2001), several crucial arguments on ethnic violence are put 
forward by Horowitz. Firstly, ethnic riots tend to occur during times of political uncertainty. Secondly, 
most ethnic riots have a strong political character, as the vast majority is set up by either political 
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parties or their supporters. Thirdly, rumours fulfil a crucial role in triggering riots. Fourthly, riot 
participants often lack remorse (Horowitz, 2001, p. 1-6, 74, 253, 366). In an earlier work of Horowitz, 
Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985), he already argued that ethnically divided societies tend to create 
party systems that mirror ethnic divisions and enable to deepen and extend them (Horowitz, 1985, p. 
291). In order to reduce ethnic conflicts, Horowitz recommends to reduce the reinforcing cleavages of 
political and ethnic divisions by encouraging both intraethnic competition and interethnic cooperation 
(Wilkinson, 2004, p. 240). 
 Horowitz’s arguments on the political character of ethnic riots are extended in Wilkinson’s 
Votes and Violence (2004). In this work, Wilkinson shows that riots occur significantly more often in 
the six months before or after elections (Wilkinson, 2004, p. 42). He argues that politicians use 
communal violence as an instrument in order to change the salience of ethnic issues (e.g. caste, 
religion, language) among the electorate in their political interest. Politicians would either instigate or 
prevent communal violence, depending on the electoral competition and the reliance of the 
government on minority votes, in order to acquire electoral gains (Wilkinson, 2004, p. 4-8). 
 Wilkinson’s instrumentalist argument is supported by Brass (1997 & 2003), who also argues 
that politicians polarise their electorate in order to solidify communal identities in their political 
interest. However, Brass argues that this is done through town-level ‘institutionalised riot systems’. In 
The Theft of an Idol (1997) and The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India 
(2003), Brass describes such institutionalised riot systems as ‘’networks of actors, groups, and 
connections involving persons from different social categories whose effect is to keep a town or city in 
a permanent state of awareness of Hindu-Muslim relationships’’ (Brass, 1997, p. 284). Since the riot 
systems uphold this awareness, communal tensions could easily be ignited by politicians when 
communal mobilisation is of political utility. Cities with well-developed riot systems would therefore 
be prone to ethnic riots (Brass, 1997, p. 284-286). 
 Yet another approach to the polarising strategies of politicians is provided by Berenschot in 
his article The Spatial Distribution of Riots (2011a), and in his book Riot Politics (2011b). In these 
studies, Berenschot addresses the link between the dependency of citizens on patronage networks and 
their susceptibility to political mobilisation for communal violence. He argues that ‘’the dependence of 
citizens on politicians to deal with state institutions structures the competition and cooperation 
between political actors, and this dependence shapes the possible strategies that political actors can 
employ to gain support and win elections’’ (Berenschot, 2011b, p. 37-38). As citizens’ dependence on 
patronage networks is stronger in poorer neighbourhoods, these neighbourhoods would be more prone 
to the polarising strategies of politicians (Berenschot, 2011a, p. 221-222, 227-228). 
 The instrumentalist explanations to India’s communal violence have been supported and 
complemented by several academic works, like The Political Logic of Ethnic Violence (2012) by 
Dhattiwala and Biggs. This article, on the communal violence in Gujarat in 2002, shows that 
communal violence was most likely where the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) faced 
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the greatest electoral competition. Analysis of the subsequent election confirmed this theory, as the 
votes for the BJP had increased the most in the constituencies where the communal violence had been 
the worst (Dhattiwala & Biggs, 2012, p. 503-504). In line with Dhattiwala and Biggs’ findings, Ticku 
managed to establish a causal relationship between Hindu-Muslim riots and BJP’s electoral 
performance in his article Riots Rewards? (2015), which shows that riots have a positive and 
significant effect on BJP’s vote share (Ticku, 2015, p. 32). 
A new dimension to the previous theories is added by Varshney in his article Ethnic Conflict 
and Civil Society (2001), and in his book Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life (2002). In these works, 
Varshney argues that the extent to which ethnic communities are susceptible to polarising actions of 
politicians, largely depends on the structure of civic ties between the different communities. Strong 
networks of intercommunal engagement would be able to control outbreaks of communal violence, 
whereas its absence or the mere presence of intracommunal engagement would open up space for 
communal violence (Varshney, 2001, p. 362-364; Varshney, 2002, p. 9-15). 
 A different perspective on inter- and intracommunal engagement is presented by Fearon and 
Laitin in Explaining Interethnic Cooperation (1996). In this article, two mechanisms are put forward 
on how interethnic cooperation could contain disputes between individual members of different groups. 
Firstly, the fear that disputes between individuals would spiral rapidly beyond the two parties would 
give rise to interethnic cooperation. Secondly, in-group policing would ensure that a group punishes its 
own member when it misbehaves towards another group. These mechanisms would contribute to 
interethnic peace, with the latter only requiring minimal interethnic interaction (Fearon & Laitin, 1996, 
p. 715-716, 730-731). This theory, that interethnic peace can be achieved with minimal interethnic 
interaction, greatly differs from Varshney’s (2001 & 2002) theory, which deems strong intercommunal 
engagement necessary for interethnic peace. 
 When studying the academic literature on the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots, support for several of 
the above described theories on communal violence can be found. Regarding the instrumentalist 
argument, Susewind and Dhattiwala show how the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots succeeded in 
strengthening the Hindu-Muslim division on the local level in the 2014 national elections (Susewind & 
Dhattiwala, 2014, p. 353, 366, 376-379). Furthermore, Berenschot upholds his own theory by arguing 
that the dependence of citizens on patronage networks helps to explain both the mobilisation of 
common villagers as well as the success of social polarisation as a profitable political strategy in 
Muzaffarnagar (Berenschot, 2014, p. 15-16). Lastly, Varshney writes that numerous political actors 
from both communities had electoral interests in reigniting communal tensions, and argues that three 
factors would be able to impede the resurgence of mass communal violence: income, Hindu-Muslim 
ties, and Modi’s political strategy (Varshney, 2014, p. 41-43). 
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2.2 Theoretical argument 
In order to answer this study’s research question, ‘’What effects did intercommunal engagement have 
on the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots?’’, all of the above described theories are of relevance. As this study 
has severe limitations in both time and resources, it uses Wilkinson’s (2004) instrumentalist theory of 
electoral incentives as a starting point, and Varshney’s (2001 & 2002) theory of civil society as the 
main explanation for the within case variation of the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots. By explaining how and 
why some towns and villages were more prone to polarising strategies of politicians than others, this 
study looks beyond the prevailing explanation for India’s communal violence. 
 Since the instrumentalist theory of electoral incentives is the prevailing explanation for the 
2013 Muzaffarnagar riots, it makes an indispensable starting point. The theory argues that politicians 
use communal violence as an instrument to change the salience of ethnic issues among the electorate 
in their political interest (Wilkinson, 2004, p. 4-8). The interaction of electoral incentives at two levels 
would determine whether politicians will either instigate or prevent communal violence. Whereas 
town-level electoral incentives would explain where communal violence breaks out, state-level 
electoral incentives would explain whether, when, and where state governments will prevent or bring 
an end to the violence. Town-level electoral incentives to instigate communal violence would emerge 
when an ethnic party faces great electoral competition on constituency-level. In order to encourage 
members of a wider ethnic category to identify with their party, politicians would change the salience 
of ethnic identities (e.g. caste, religion, language) by polarising the electorate as in their political 
interest (Wilkinson, 2004, p. 4-8). Since the instigation of communal violence is electorally motivated, 
the riots occur significantly more often the six months before or after elections. During these months 
political parties attempt to influence voting behaviour as well as the process of coalition formation 
(Wilkinson, 2004, p. 42). State-level electoral incentives to prevent or stop communal violence would 
emerge when the incumbent state government relies on minority votes, or when it is likely that the 
incumbent state government has to rely on the cooperation with minority supported parties in the 
future (Wilkinson, 2004, p. 4-8). 
 The extent to which ethnic communities are susceptible to the polarising strategies of 
politicians, would largely depend on the structure of civic ties between the different communities. As 
Varshney’s (2001 & 2002) theory acknowledges politicians’ use of polarising strategies, it builds on 
the instrumentalist argument, but with the addition and focus on the element of civil society. A 
common academic definition of civil society is ‘’the space in a given society that (a) exists between 
the family level and the state level, (b) makes interconnections between individuals or families 
possible, and (c) is independent of the state’’ (Varshney, 2002, p. 39-40). Hence civil society forms a 
non-state space of collective life that can cover both social and political activities (Varshney, 2002, p. 
4). 
 The concept of civil society has been used in different ways. According to Putnam (1993), the 
civic networks of civil society produce trust and shared norms among communities, which he calls 
7 
 
social capital. Putnam regards social capital essential to make a democracy work. Varshney (2001 & 
2002) however, uses a completely different approach as he links civil society to ethnic conflict. 
Whereas Putnam studies whether civic engagement exists, Varshney studies whether civic engagement 
cuts across different communities, as civic engagement that remains within one community is often 
associated with the escalation of communal tensions (Varshney, 2002, p. 319-320). Thus, Varshney 
makes a distinction between intercommunal and intracommunal engagement. Strong networks of 
intercommunal engagement would be able to control rising communal tensions, whereas its absence or 
the mere presence of intracommunal engagement would open up space for communal tensions. The 
former would be able to build bridges and manage tensions between communities, whereas the latter 
fails to do this. The presence or absence of intercommunal engagement would therefore help to 
explain why communal violence occurs in some towns and villages, but not in others. This theory is 
represented in Figure 1.1 (Varshney, 2001, p. 362-364, 379-380; Varshney, 2002, p. 9-15). 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Communal Violence and Peace (Varshney, 2002, p. 12) 
 
 Inter- and intracommunal engagement can, in turn, be broken down into associational and 
everyday forms of civic engagement. Examples of associational forms of civic engagement are 
‘’business associations, professional organisations, reading clubs, film clubs, sports clubs, festival 
organisations, trade unions, and cadre-based political parties’’ (Varshney, 2002, p. 3). Examples of 
everyday forms of civic engagement are ‘’routine interactions of life as Hindu and Muslim families 
visiting each other, eating together often enough, jointly participating in festivals, and allowing their 
children to play together in the neighbourhood’’ (Varshney, 2002, p. 3). Regarding associational and 
everyday forms of intercommunal engagement, both promote peace, strengthen the sense of communal 
harmony, and mutually reinforce each other. Whereas everyday forms of intercommunal engagement 
allow the formation of temporary organisations in times of communal conflict, the associational forms 
produce an even stronger fundament to withstand exogenous shocks (e.g. partitions, desecrations of 
holy places, election results, unconfirmed rumours) and polarising strategies of politicians. As 
associational networks serve the economic, cultural, and social interests of multiple communities, 
interdependence emerges. This provides communities with incentives to maintain good intercommunal 
Polarising Strategies of 
Politicians 
Intracommunal 
Engagement 
Communal Violence 
Intercommunal 
Engagement 
Communal Peace 
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relations, which decreases the likelihood of violent ethnic conflict, and constrains politicians’ attempts 
to polarise the electorate along communal lines (Varshney, 2002, p. 3-5, 9-12). 
 Consequently, the following hypothesis is derived from Varshney’s (2002) theory: 
 
The stronger the intercommunal engagement, the greater is the capacity to withstand the polarising 
strategies of politicians, and the less likely is the occurrence of communal violence. 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1 Case selection 
The 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots make a highly relevant case to be explained by Wilkinson’s (2004) 
theory of electoral incentives, and Varshney’s (2001 & 2002) theory of civil society due to the 
following reasons. Firstly, the riots have been the largest outburst of communal violence in India since 
the 2002 violence in Gujarat (Berenschot, 2014, p. 15). This makes the riots one of the most 
significant cases of Hindu-Muslim violence in contemporary India, especially in the light of the 
supposed growing Hindu nationalist sentiments across the country (Varshney, 2014, p. 41; Ticku, 
2015, p. 2). Secondly, the riots took place in the run up to India’s national elections in 2014, which 
were won with a massive victory by the Hindu nationalist BJP (Varshney, 2014, p. 34; Berenschot, 
2014, p. 15). Thirdly, the riots took place in a region that for generations had been characterised by 
economic interdependence between Hindu Jat farmers and Muslims. Despite these associational 
networks of civic engagement, the communities have not been able to control the rising communal 
tensions (Berenschot, 2014, p. 15). Fourthly, neighbours from different communities, in both urban 
and rural context, have been mobilised to attack each other in the riots (Muralidharan, 2014, p. 41). 
The spread of communal violence to the rural context is remarkable, as communal violence is 
associated with the urban context, not with the intimate settings of villages, where strong everyday 
networks of civic engagement usually prevail (Varshney, 2001, p. 375-376). Fifthly, the riots are 
characterised by large within case variation, as some localities in the region experienced large 
outbursts of communal violence, whereas others did not (Rao, Mishra, Singh, Bajpai, 2013, p. 10, 22). 
Sixthly, the riots are still underexplored academically. 
3.2 Method of analysis 
This study conducts an explorative qualitative analysis of the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots, using 
Wilkinson’s (2004) instrumentalist theory of electoral incentives as a starting point, and Varshney’s 
(2001 & 2002) theory of civil society as the main explanation for the within case variation. By 
addressing the effects of intercommunal engagement on the riots, this study looks for a deeper 
understanding of Hindu-Muslim violence in contemporary India. 
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 The 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots are a case with large within case variation. Although all the 
violent incidents seem to be linked to and influenced by the same events as well as by each other, 
some towns and villages were more prone to communal violence than others. This variation is 
explained by the localities’ structures of civil society, however adequate comparative case studies are 
not possible at this point due to the inconsistency of available data. Therefore, a qualitative approach is 
used to conduct an in-depth analysis of the available data on the effects of intercommunal engagement 
on the riots. 
3.3 Data 
In this study, the main sources for analysis of the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots are secondary data, as the 
research is based on information that is derived from fact-finding reports, and from secondary 
literature. The fact-finding reports that are subjected to an in-depth analysis for this study are obtained 
from ANHAD (2013), Centre for Policy Analysis (2013a & 2013b), Citizens’s Inquiry Team (2013), 
Joint Citizens’ Initiative (2013), Muzaffarnagar Adhikar Jan Mach (MAJMA) (2015), National 
Commission for Minorities (2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2014a, & 2014b), Rao, Mishra, Singh, & 
Bajpai (2013), and Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) (2014). 
 Since Wilkinson’s (2004) theory of electoral incentives is used as an essential starting point 
for this study, supporting evidence for the theory is demonstrated on the basis of existing analyses of 
the secondary literature on the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots (e.g. Ahmed, 2013; Berenschot, 2014; 
Muralidharan, 2014; Susewind & Dhattiwala, 2014; Varshney, 2014), as well as on the observations of 
the above mentioned fact-finding reports. Factors that are required to support the theory are (a) strong 
electoral competition, and (b) the instigation of communal violence by politicians through polarising 
strategies such as delivering inflammatory speeches, and spreading rumours. 
 Varshney’s (2001 & 2002) theory of civil society is used as the main explanation for the 
within case variation of the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots. An in-depth analysis of the above mentioned 
fact-finding reports has been conducted to study the effects of intercommunal engagement on the riots. 
Data has been collected to link the structure of civic life in numerous towns and villages in the riot-
affected region to the presence or absence of communal violence. Based on the theory, it is expected 
that towns and villages which had strong intercommunal engagement are less affected by communal 
violence than towns and villages which lacked strong intercommunal engagement. However, it is 
important to note that this expectation is probabilistic, and not law-like. In order to determine whether 
intercommunal engagement was present, several factors need to be accounted for, with both (a) 
associational and (b) everyday forms of intercommunal engagement being of importance. 
 To establish whether everyday forms of intercommunal engagement were present, the 
everyday interaction between citizens of different communities needs to be assessed. This interaction 
has an informal and non-organisational character, like ‘’Hindu and Muslim families regularly visiting 
each other, eating together in social settings, allowing their children to play together, and jointly 
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participating in festivals’’ (Varshney, 2002, p. 3-5; Varshney, 2001, p. 363, 383). An important 
prerequisite for the presence of everyday intercommunal engagement is that the different communities 
live close to each other, rather than in segregated sections. Everyday intercommunal engagement is 
therefore likely to be stronger in the intimate setting of a village (Varshney, 2001, p. 375-376). 
 To determine whether associational forms of intercommunal engagement were present, the 
organised interaction between citizens of different communities needs to be assessed. This interaction 
has a more formal character, and is demonstrated by all kinds of civic associations like ‘’business 
associations, professional organisations, reading clubs, film clubs, sports clubs, festival organisations, 
trade unions, and cadre-based political parties’’ (Varshney, 2002, p. 3-5). These associational 
networks of intercommunal engagement are usually solid as they create economic, cultural, and social 
interdependence between different communities (Varshney, 2002, p. 9-12). 
 
4. Analysis 
4.1 The sequence of events leading up to the riots 
In the run up to the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots, a sequence of events took place that increased the 
communal tensions, and eventually led to the outbursts of communal violence. This sequence started 
with an incident on 27 August 2013 in Kawal, a Muslim majority village in the district of 
Muzaffarnagar. Different narratives have circulated on the cause of this incident, and the nature of the 
dispute remains contested up to present day. According to the dominant narrative, a Hindu Jat girl, 
from the Jat majority village of Malikpur, was repeatedly harassed by a Muslim boy from Kawal. In 
order to defend their community’s honour, two brothers of the girl would have killed the Muslim boy. 
Subsequently, the two Hindu Jat brothers would have been lynched to death by a Muslim mob out of 
retaliation. However, according to another narrative, which is deemed more credible by several fact-
finding reports, the incident had nothing to do with sexual harassment. Instead, the incident would be 
caused by a minor traffic accident, which had escalated into a violent conflict between the three boys, 
resulting in their deaths. Nevertheless, although violent incidents are nothing uncommon in this highly 
crime-prone district of Uttar Pradesh, the incident was given a communal colour (Ahmed, 2013, p. 10; 
Berenschot, 2014, p. 15; Muralidharan, 2014, p. 41; TISS, 2014, p. 7). 
 In the days following the Kawal incident, the communal tensions in the Muzaffarnagar district 
rose as reprisals against the Muslim community were carried out by Hindu Jats, with Muslims reacting 
hereupon in a similar manner. Despite the imposition of an official ban on public meetings, a Muslim 
gathering was held on 30 August 2013 in the town of Muzaffarnagar after the Friday prayers. At this 
meeting the communal tensions were addressed by district and state-level Muslim leaders whom are 
affiliated with political parties such as Congress, the Samajwadi Party (SP), and the Bahujan Samaj 
Party (BSP), and inflammatory speeches were delivered (Ahmed, 2013, p. 10; Rao, Mishra, Singh, & 
Bajpai, 2013, p. 7-10). 
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 During these days, a fake video that would show the brutal killing of the two Hindu Jats 
according to several claims, circulated on social media, which pushed the communal tensions even 
further. As a result, the Hindu Jats called for a panchayat, a communal gathering, in Lisarh on 5 
September 2016. During this panchayat a mahapanchayat, a large communal gathering, was 
announced for 7 September 2016 in Nangla Mandour, and participants were allegedly asked to come 
armed. The Hindu right-wing party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and the Hindu nationalist 
organisation, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), supposedly played a crucial role in organising this 
mahapanchayat. Their local leaders addressed an estimated 40,000 Hindu Jats at the mahapanchayat, 
and delivered inflammatory speeches in which they openly incited communal hatred. As reported, the 
Hindu Jats, charged with hate subsequently, drove through several Muslim majority villages while 
shouting highly provocative slogans on return from the gathering, which consequently led to violent 
confrontations that resulted in deaths for both communities. This marked the start of the communal 
riots. In the following two days, the violence spread through the district and its adjoining districts, 
fuelled by rumours, and with organised Hindu Jat mobs attacking the Muslim communities in 
numerous villages and towns. Eventually, the army brought an end to the violence (Ahmed, 2013, p. 
10; Rao, Singh, & Bajpai, 2013, p. 7-13; NCM, 2013a, p. 3-4; Citizens’s Inquiry Team, 2013, p. 5; 
ANHAD, 2013, p. 7-8). 
 The official records on the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots show that the attacks against Muslims 
affected dozens of villages. The actual attacks took place in about nine villages in Muzaffarnagar and 
about five villages in Shamli, which left at least 52 people dead (15 Hindus and 37 Muslims), 60 
people injured, and 80 houses burnt. However, Muslims fled from an additional 74 villages, as they 
feared outbreaks of communal violence (MAJMA, 2015, p. 8; TISS, 2014, p. 14; Berenschot, 2014, p. 
15). This resulted in the displacement of an estimated 50,000 people, of which about 30 children frose 
to death in the refugee camps (Berenschot, 2014, p. 15). 
4.2 Background to the communal tensions 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots, some background to the 
communal tensions is needed. As the violence mainly took place in the districts of Muzaffarnagar and 
Shamli, some details are provided on these districts to give an idea of the context. 
 Muzaffarnagar is a district and parliamentary constituency within the Indian state of Uttar 
Pradesh. Its population was around 2.9 million in 2011, and is characterised by a high proportion of 
Muslims, Jats, and Dalits. Muslims would constitute about 45 percent of the district’s population. 
Shamli is the adjoining district, and is part of the parliamentary constituency of Kairana. Its population 
was about 1.3 million in 2011, and has a similar composition of ethnic communities. Muslims would 
account for approximately 40 percent of the district’s population (Centre for Policy Analysis, 2013a, p. 
18; NCM, 2013a, p. 5; NCM, 2013b, p. 1). 
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 The districts of Muzaffarnagar and Shamli are part of an agriculturally rich region that has 
economically gained from the Green Revolution in the 1970s and the 1980s (MAJMA, 2015, p. 5). 
Despite the fact that Muslims are present in large numbers, they hardly own land, as the fields are 
predominantly owned by the Hindu Jats. Most of the Muslims either work on the land of the Jats, or as 
daily workers at brick kilns, or have petty businesses, or work in other places of the country. As 
agriculture forms the prime source of income in the area, a feudal and patriarchal system has emerged 
over time, which provides the Jats with substantial economic power in the region. Furthermore, due to 
their prosperity and former favourable public policies, Jats also dominate the bureaucracy and police 
in the districts (Centre for Policy Analysis, 2013a, p. 18; MAJMA, 2015, p. 5; Citizens's Inquiry Team, 
2013, p. 2-3). 
 The economic and political power of the Hindu Jat farmers has traditionally been protected by 
the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), a political party, and the Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU), a Hindu 
nationalist farmers’ representative organisation. These Hindu associations have been controlling the 
political space in the region, leaving only limited space for negotiation with the better off non-Jats, 
including the better off Muslim community, the Muley Jats. This led to a feudal parallel system of 
governance, where the elites decide for all and govern all aspects of life, with little space for any 
democratic institutions, equality, justice, and women rights. The economically weak, both Hindus and 
Muslims, were hence exploited by the elites. Nevertheless, due to their economic interdependence, this 
did not lead to communal violence. The Jats and the other communities lived peacefully in this region 
of Uttar Pradesh, with the land owners taking care of their workers’ basic needs (MAJMA, 2015, p. 5; 
Centre for Policy Analysis, 2013a, p. 6; Citizens’s Inquiry Team, 2013, p. 2-3). 
 This unequal but stable relationship between Hindu Jat farmers and Muslims changed when 
trends of lower-class mobility among Muslims emerged. In the years prior to the riots, 
Muzaffarnagar’s Muslim community seems to have made economic progress due to several reasons. 
Firstly, the Muslim community’s access to state resources improved through the patronage networks 
of the ruling Samajwadi Party (SP), which relies on the votes of Muslims. Secondly, while the Jat 
farmers were facing agrarian crises and stagnant productivity, the Muslims started to have more 
economic successes in trade and commerce, with the ones working in other parts of the country 
sending their income back home. This decreased the economic dependency of Muslims on their 
unequal relationship with the Jats, and therefore changed the relationship between the two 
communities (MAJMA, 2015, p. 6-7; Rao, Mishra, Singh, & Bajpai, 2013, p. 35-37; TISS, 2013, p. 
12-13). 
 Another, more underlying reason that had been strengthening the cleavage between Hindu Jats 
and Muslims, was the exclusion of the Jat community from the affirmative action category of Other 
Backward Classes (OBC) in the post-Mandal Commission period. As the Jats had been the leaders of 
backward caste consolidation, the exclusion made them feel isolated, marginalised, and politically 
neglected. This exclusion was still felt by the Jat community, especially by the young, low educated, 
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unemployed Jats, as the Samajwadi Party government reserved posts for OBC’s in the state police 
department. This increased the economic difficulties and discontent that were experienced by the 
Hindu Jats (Rao, Mishra, Singh, & Bajpai, 2013, p. 18-19, 35-37). 
 These trends, both political and economic, caused large resentment among the Hindu Jats, as 
they felt it threatened their powerful position, and their control over the region. Whereas the Hindu 
Jats traditionally had controlled the local institutions, and had exercised large influence on the voting 
outcomes of elections, their traditional hold over society was now undermined by the new Muslim 
leaders, and the economic mobility among the Muslim community. This supposedly made the Hindu 
Jat farmers susceptible to the polarising strategies of politicians in the run up to the 2014 Indian 
general election (MAJMA, 2015, p. 6-7; TISS, 2013, p. 12-13). 
4.3 Electoral incentives for communal violence 
The existing analyses of the secondary literature, as well as the observations of the fact-finding reports 
show that electoral incentives lay at the basis of the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots. Supporting evidence for 
the required factors of the theory is abundantly available, as both (a) strong electoral competition and 
(b) the instigation of communal violence by politicians through polarising strategies were present in 
the run-up to the riots. 
 Uttar Pradesh forms an important state for India’s general elections, as it accounts for 80 of the 
total 545 parliamentary seats. The western part of the state, where the districts of Muzaffarnagar and 
Shamli are located, accounts for 14 parliamentary seats, and is dominated by the Hindu Jats (Centre 
for Policy Analysis, 2013a, p. 20-21; MAJMA, 2015, p. 5-6). This electoral opportunity has long made 
the region of electoral interest for the Hindu right-wing party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 
However, the existing political structures of the region formed strong electoral competition to the BJP, 
and needed to be undermined first, before the BJP could consolidate the votes of Hindu Jats (Centre 
for Policy Analysis, 2013a, p. 20-21; Citizens’s Inquiry Team, 2013, p. 2-3). 
 In the run-up to India’s general elections in May 2014, electoral gains were of crucial 
importance for the BJP, as the opposition party had experienced two electoral debacles since they had 
returned to their hard-line ideological agenda. The BJP faced great electoral competition, since the 
Hindu Jat community was politically divided among political parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party 
(BSP), Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), and Indian National Congress (Muralidharan, 2014, p. 35; 
Berenschot, 2014, p. 15; MAJMA, 2015, p. 5-6). As the BJP needed to recover lost ground in Uttar 
Pradesh, the party increased the communal tensions between the Hindu Jats and Muslims, which 
would consolidate the votes of the powerful Hindu Jat community (Berenschot, 2014, p. 15; Centre for 
Policy Analysis, 2013a, p. 20-21; TISS, 2013, p. 9). In order to do so, the BJP has been spreading 
rumours, circulating fake videos of the Kawal incident on social media, and touring the region 
intensely. Furthermore, the party has played a crucial role in organising several panchayats and the 
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mahapanchayat on 7 September 2013, where they delivered inflammatory speeches (Berenschot, 2014, 
p. 15; Ahmed, 2013, p. 10; Rao, Mishra, Singh, & Bajpai, 2013). 
 As described in the previous section, the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) and the Bharatiya Kisan 
Union (BKU) had traditionally been controlling the political space in the region, and formed a parallel 
system of governance. Whereas the RLD relies on the votes of both Hindu Jats and Muslims, the BKU 
formed an alliance between the elites of the Hindu Jats and the Muslim Muley Jats. According to 
respondents of the fact-finding report of MAJMA, including Jats, the BJP had both the electoral and 
the ideological incentives to break up this political monopoly (MAJMA, 2015, p. 5; Citizens's Inquiry 
Team, 2013, p. 2-3). The polarisation of Hindu Jats and Muslims was a successful strategy, since it 
would undermine the RLD’s political stronghold, and electorally benefit the BJP (TISS, 2013, p. 7-8).
 In the months preceding the riots, the division between the communities was systematically 
built up by Hindu nationalist organisations like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), its affiliates, and 
the BJP. This was done by giving incidents a communal colour in the media, and spreading hate 
through politicians, rumours, leaflets, and graffiti. In this politics of hate, community honour was one 
of the recurring themes, which mainly addressed the dignity of women. Within this narrative, Hindu 
nationalist propaganda about a so-called ‘love jihad’ was spread, referring to Muslim boys seducing 
Hindu girls, which created fear among the Hindu Jat community (Muralidharan, 2014, p. 41; Centre 
for Policy Analysis, 2013a, p. 4-5; MAJMA, 2015, p. 7; Rao, Mishra, Singh, & Bajpai, 2013, p. 35-37; 
Citizens’s Inquiry Team, 2013, p. 3-4; ANHAD, 2013, p. 4; TISS, 2014, p. 7). This created an 
atmosphere in which every interaction between men and women from different faiths was considered 
to be suspicious, which restrained the mobility of the Jat women. The Kawal incident on 27 August 
2013 fitted perfectly within this polarising narrative, and was framed as an intercommunal dispute 
affecting the community honour (Centre for Policy Analysis, 2013a, p. 4-5). 
 Furthermore, from several fact-finding reports it becomes clear that the BJP was not the only 
party that was likely to gain politically from communal violence. Both Muslims and Jats argue that the 
ruling Samajwadi Party (SP) state government has also acted out of electoral incentives. Since it was 
crucial for the SP to maintain the support of the Muslim community, it is argued that the SP also 
expected to benefit from the rising communal tensions within society, as the sharp polarisation 
undermined the vote shares of parties that relied on both Hindu Jats and Muslims. However, since the 
SP government reacted with indecision and inaction to the increasing tensions, large scale violence 
erupted, and spread through the region (Berenschot, 2014, p. 15; Centre for Policy Analysis, 2013a, p. 
16, p. 19-21; MAJMA, 2015, p. 57; Rao, Mishra, Singh, & Bajpai, 2013, p. 35-37; TISS, 2014, p. 7-9). 
The SP government declared that the severity of the violence, which strongly affected the villages, 
came unexpected to them. The failure to protect the Muslim community against the one-sided violence 
of the Hindu Jats, took away any possible benefit for the SP from the polarisation of the electorate, and 
the party lost most of its support of the Muslim community (Centre for Policy Analysis, 2013a, p. 20-
21). 
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 After the riots, the Muslim votes were likely to shift from the Samajwadi Party (SP) to the 
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), with some possibilities for Congress to enlarge their vote bank as well. 
The BJP, which had been proactive in polarising the electorate, was likely to make the biggest political 
gains through the consolidation of Hindu Jat votes. As the riots had a polarising impact throughout the 
western part of Uttar Pradesh, the BJP was confident to make large electoral gains beyond the riot-
affected region as well (Centre for Policy Analysis, 2013a, p. 19-21; Centre for Policy Analysis, 
2013b, p. 5). The results of the Indian 2014 general elections reveal that the BJP did win with a 
massive victory, including all of the parliamentary constituencies in the western part of Uttar Pradesh 
(Election Results Lok Sabha 2014; Varshney, 2014, p. 34). 
 Altogether, the secondary literature and the fact-finding reports provide strong support for the 
theory that electoral incentives have induced the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots. In sum, the above analysis 
shows that strong electoral competition was present, since many parties were likely to gain politically 
from the communal tensions, and communal violence was instigated though polarising strategies, 
which changed the salience of ethnic identities among the electorate. 
4.4 The structure of civil society 
Whereas the previous section showed that polarising strategies of political elites have played a crucial 
role in the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots, this section digs deeper into the dynamics of India’s recent 
Hindu-Muslim violence by addressing the capacity of intercommunal engagement to constraint these 
polarising strategies. The structure of civil society is used to explain the within case variation of the 
riots, or in other words, how and why some towns and villages were more prone to the polarising 
strategies of politicians than others. The degree of the required factors for the theory, namely (a) 
intercommunal engagement and (b) intracommunal engagement, is therefore analysed and linked to 
the degree of communal violence, with a further distinction being made between associational and 
everyday engagement. This is done based on an analysis of the observations of the fact-finding reports. 
General observations are discussed first, followed by a discussion of specific cases. 
 In the riot-affected districts of Muzaffarnagar and Shamli, there has been a long-standing 
tradition of economic interdependence between Hindu Jat farmers and Muslims (Berenschot, 2014, p. 
15). This economic interdependence formed a peculiar kind of associational intercommunal 
engagement, since it was characterised as a feudal and unequal relationship between the two 
communities. Whereas the lands were predominantly owned by the Hindu Jats, many Muslims had 
worked for the Jats as labour on their fields, or as domestic helpers. However, despite the fact that this 
relationship was of an unequal nature, according to many respondents in the fact-finding reports it 
made the region less communally sensitive, as communal tensions could have disturbed the economic 
arrangements. Hence the Jats and the other communities peacefully lived together in the region, with 
the land owners taking care of their labour’s basic needs. Before the riots in 2013, the districts of 
Muzaffarnagar and Shamli had never experienced communal violence (Centre for Policy Analysis, 
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2013a, p. 18; MAJMA, 2015, p. 5; Citizens’s Inquiry Team, 2013, p. 2-3). This indicates that this 
peculiar kind of associational intercommunal engagement was strong, and kept communal tensions 
down. 
 In recent years, the relative socio-economic successes of the Muslim community made the 
Muslims less dependent on their unequal relationship with the Hindu Jats. Acknowledged by the 
Hindu Jats, the trend of Muslims asserting economic and political independence caused large 
discontent among the Hindu Jat community, since they felt it threatened their powerful position in the 
region. In several fact-finding reports it is argued that the rising resentment among the Hindu Jat 
community against the Muslim community created fertile grounds for the polarising strategies of 
politicians (TISS, 2014, p. 12-13; MAJMA, 2015, p. 6-7; Rao, Mishra, Singh, & Bajpai, 2013, p. 35-
37). This suggests that as the economic arrangements between Hindu Jats and Muslims declined at the 
expense of the Hindu Jats, the strength of the associational networks of intercommunal engagement 
decreased, which made the Hindu Jats more susceptible to the polarising strategies of politicians. 
 The everyday forms of intercommunal engagement in many villages also turned out to be not 
strong enough to withstand the polarising strategies of the Hindu nationalist forces in the districts of 
Muzaffarnagar and Shamli. A strong cleavage was created between two communities which had lived 
together in amity and in close proximity to each other for decades (Centre for Policy Analysis, 2013a, 
p. 3-4, 9). A striking aspect of the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots is that the communal violence mainly 
took place in a rural setting. This is striking as communal violence is normally associated with the 
relative anonymity of the urban context of a city. The intimate and familiar atmosphere of a village is 
known to create an everyday form of intercommunal engagement, which would make it less prone to 
politicians’ attempts to instigate communal violence. Since the riots did take place in villages, the 
sense of betrayal and distrust among the Muslim community aggravated (Centre for Policy Analysis, 
2013a, p. 3-4; Centre for Policy Analysis, 2013b, p. 2-3). 
 The adjoining villages of Hussainpur and Mohammadpur Raisingh in the district of 
Muzaffarnagar make an interesting case within the context of the 2013 riots. The village of Hussainpur 
has a mixed population consisting of approximately 3,000 Muslims and 2,000 Hindus. However, its 
Hindu population has no Jats. Furthermore, most households, including the Muslims, own some land. 
Mohammadpur Raisingh on the other hand, is dominated by the Jat community. The interesting part is 
that the two villages’ agricultural fields are mixed and interspersed (Centre for Policy Analysis, 2013b, 
p. 2; Rao, Mishra, Singh, & Bajpai, 2013, p. 22). As both villages are economically dependent on their 
fields, a pact between the two villages was formed when the communal tensions in the region had 
escalated. Whereas the different communities of the villages normally worked between one another 
during the entire day, they agreed to work on their fields at different times of the day as long as the 
communal tensions prevailed, in order to avoid communal conflict (Rao, Mishra, Singh, & Bajpai, 
2013, p. 20, 23, 25). This arrangement did function, but broke down on 30 October 2013, when three 
Muslim boys from Hussainpur were killed in the fields. The events of this incident remain contested, 
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as both communities blame each other for attacking each other (Rao, Mishra, Singh, & Bajpai, 2013, p. 
20, 23). However, the economic interests of the two communities did make a temporary peace 
arrangement possible to a certain extent. 
 Nevertheless, no communal violence has occurred in the village of Hussainpur. After the 
Kawal incident of 27 August, the peace committee of Hussainpur set up mixed teams, comprising all 
communities, to keep vigil at nights. According to the villagers of Hussainpur, no communal violence 
ever occurred in their village, despite large exogenous shocks such as India’s independence in 1947 
and the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992. The villagers stated that all villages that are not 
dominated by Jats have peace committees, and declared that ‘’if anyone of their religious leaders took 
any position on their behalf, without consulting them, they would reject it’’ (Rao, Mishra, Singh, & 
Bajpai, 2013, p. 22, 24). Although the villagers acknowledged that there are good Jats in the region as 
well, whom have helped or protected their Muslim neighbours, they argued that somehow all riots 
took place in the Jat dominated villages. The Hindu Jats of Mohammadpur Raisingh would resent the 
relative socio-economic successes of the Muslims of Hussainpur (Rao, Mishra, Singh, & Bajpai, 2013, 
p. 24). 
 The argument of the villagers of Hussainpur that communal violence only took place in Jat 
dominated villages, suggests that villages’ ethnic composition and ratio of communities are of crucial 
importance for the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots. This statement is endorsed by the observations of 
numerous fact-finding reports, emphasizing that ‘’no communal violence has been reported from any 
of the Muslim dominated villages in the district’’ (Rao, Mishra, Singh, & Bajpai, 2013, p. 6). No riots, 
killings, or damages to temples took place in Muslim majority villages. Also no violence was reported 
north of Muzaffarnagar, where the Hindu Jat community forms a minority (Rao, Mishra, Singh, & 
Bajpai, p. 10, 17-18). Additionally, most of the communal violence only took place in Jat majority 
villages where the Muslims formed a small minority (MAJMA, 2015, p. 8; ANHAD, 2013, p. 10). 
This suggests the organisational character of the riots, as the team of the Centre of Policy Analysis 
concluded that Muslims were attacked not with the intent of killing them, but with the purpose of 
making them flee from the Hindu Jat majority villages in order to end the decades of coexistence 
(Centre of Policy Analysis, 2013a, p. 10). The displacement of Muslims from Hindu Jat majority 
villages destroyed many familial and community bonds that were built up for generations (TISS, 2014, 
p. 4). This extremely polarising strategy cuts off all possible forms of intercommunal engagement, and 
has electorally benefited the BJP. Moreover, the above analysis indicates that the villages’ ethnic 
composition and the ratio of communities strongly influence the likelihood of communal violence. It 
suggests that an unequal ratio of communities leads to an unequal relationship between the 
communities, and therefore undermines the likelihood of strong intercommunal engagement. 
 Since the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots mainly consisted of one-sided violence of Hindu Jats 
targeted at the Muslim community, the commonly used frame of Hindu-Muslim violence is misleading. 
Other Hindu castes and communities have stayed out of the conflict, and have maintained their old 
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relations with the Muslim community. However, it is widely acknowledged that some Dalits were 
forced by the dominant Jats to take part in the communal strife. Altogether, the Hindu Jats have 
mainly isolated themselves from the other communities with the breach of communal peace (Centre 
for Policy Analysis, 2013b, p. 6; TISS, 2014, p. 10; MAJMA, 2015, p. 22). 
 The fact that almost exclusively Hindu Jats attacked the Muslim community during the 2013 
Muzaffarnagar riots, indicates that intracommunal engagement was of crucial importance. Since 
networks of intracommunal engagement already have a communal character, they are often easily 
susceptible to polarising strategies of politicians. Intracommunal engagement is therefore associated 
with the escalation of communal tensions. Based on the observations of the fact-finding reports, the 
existing forms of intracommunal engagement among Hindu Jats in the districts of Muzaffarnagar and 
Shamli were strengthened in the run-up to the riots by several factors. The presence or absence of 
strong intracommunal engagement and its strengthening factors would explain why communal 
violence did occur in some Jat dominated villages and not in others. These are discussed now. 
 Firstly, the Hindu Jat community formed the economic and political powerful majority within 
the region. In order to keep up this dominant position, associational intracommunal engagement was 
present in the form of the Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU). This Hindu nationalist farmers' 
representative organisation protected the interests of the Hindu Jats, and only left little space for 
negotiation with better off non-Jats. Although the BKU was ostensibly an apolitical force, it provided 
support to the Hindu Jat cause when the communal tensions rose (Centre for Policy Analysis, 2013a, p. 
6; Centre for Policy Analysis, 2013b; p. 6; Citizens’s Inquiry Team, 2013, p. 3; MAJMA, 2015, p. 5). 
Secondly, the segregation of communities within villages leads to a higher degree of everyday 
intracommunal engagement. In the villages where Hindu Jats lived together in one part of the village, 
their daily interactions were mostly limited to their own community. The degree of everyday 
intracommunal engagement was therefore higher, and at the expense of everyday intercommunal 
engagement (MAJMA, 2015, p. 46). Thirdly, the (maha)panchayats of the Hindu Jats, and the 
gatherings of the Muslims in the months preceding the riots, seem to have played a crucial role in the 
polarisation of the two communities. These assemblies had a strong intracommunal nature, where both 
communities’ leaders and prominent politicians addressed their communities with inflammatory 
speeches, which strongly undermined any form of intercommunal engagement. The areas where 
panchayats were held often experienced communal violence (Centre for Policy Analysis, 2013a, p. 6-7, 
11). 
 In order to further illustrate and support the above observations, the case study research of the 
team of Muzaffarnagar Adhikar Jan Manch (MAJMA) is discussed and linked to the theory of civil 
society. In this research, the team studied six villages in total, three in each district. The villages of 
Kiwana, Ailum, and Simbhalka are located in the district of Shamli. The villages of Nalla, Khera 
Mastan, and Kharar are located in the district in Muzaffarnagar. All the villages share the 
characteristics that they are large, have a mixed population profile with a Hindu Jat majority, are 
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located close to the outbreaks of the violence, and have some survivors that returned (MAJMA, 2015, 
p. 31). 
 The first village, Kiwana, was segregated with the communities living apart from each other. 
The relationship between the Muslims and Jats was unequal as the Muslims depended on the Jats for 
work. However, the two communities shared a cordial relationship in their economic interdependency. 
This peculiar kind of associational intercommunal engagement was complemented by a strong degree 
of everyday intercommunal engagement, since the two communities took part in each other’s social 
events, and were invited to each other’s marriages. Furthermore, the communities’ women’s relations 
were amicable, as they shared and exchanged household items. Disagreements were solved with 
discussions. No violence took place during the riots in Kiwana, but because of the violence close by, 
the Muslims had to be evacuated, with the assistance of the villagers and police (MAJMA, 2015, p. 
32-35). 
 The second village, Ailum, was segregated with the Hindu Jats living at either side of the 
village, and the Muslims in the middle. Everyday intercommunal engagement was present between the 
richer Muslims and the Hindu Jats as they had an informal and cordial relationship, in which they 
regularly visited each other, and shared household items. The rest of the Muslims did not enjoy such 
interactions with the Hindu Jats, but depended on them for their livelihood. No violence took place in 
Ailum, but the Muslims had to flee, as violent Jat mobs of neighbouring villages were gathering 
outside the village. After much insistence, the Muslims were saved by the police, with the assistance 
of some Jat villagers (MAJMA, 2015, p. 37-40). 
 The third village, Simbhalka, was strongly segregated along lines of caste and faith. Whereas 
the Hindu Jats live in the centre of the village, the other communities live on the peripheries. Due to 
the segregation, the communities’ interactions were mostly limited to their own community. The 
village was therefore characterised by strong intracommunal engagement, and everyday forms of 
intercommunal engagement lacked. However, the Muslims were heavily dependent on the Jats for 
their livelihood. When the riots started, many rumours were spread, which made many Muslims leave 
the village. Violence did take place in Simbhalka, which left about eight or nine Muslim houses 
plundered and destroyed, and about two or three people injured (MAJMA, 2015, p. 43-48). 
 The fourth village, Nalla, was not segregated, since the different communities were living 
close to each other. However, due to a deep sense of religious identity and prejudices, the village 
lacked proper intracommunal engagement. Furthermore, most of the Muslims were independent 
workers, not depending on the Jats for their livelihood, and gradually improved their economic 
position in recent years. This caused large discontent among the Jat community. Due to the lack of 
both intra- and intercommunal engagement, tensions were already present before the riots. Therefore 
violence did take place in Nalla, but most Muslims had already left the village by then. The violence 
left several Muslim houses destroyed, most of them belonging to the richer Muslim families (MAJMA, 
2015, p. 50-56). 
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 The fifth village, Khera Mastan, was segregated. However, strong everyday intracommunal 
engagement was present between the Hindu Jats and the Muslims. Although their relationship was 
unequal, it was cordial and social, with both communities regularly visiting each other’s homes, and 
participating in each other’s festivals. When a violent Jat mob from a neighbouring village started 
attacking Khera Mastan’s Muslim community, the headman of the village intervened, and made the 
mob leave. Subsequently, the Muslims that had not fled yet, were evacuated as a precaution (MAJMA, 
2015, p. 57-64). 
 The sixth village, Kharar, was divided into twelve colonies. There was no segregation along 
communal lines, since the different communities lived together within the colonies. However, the 
interactions between the colonies were limited. Whereas the Hindu Jats and the rich Muslim Muley 
Jats lived near each other and had good personal interactions due to their similar economic standing, 
this proper everyday intercommunal engagement lacked between the Muslim Muley Jats and the other 
Muslims in the village. Furthermore, except for the employee-employer relationship, there was no 
form of civic engagement between the poorer Muslims and the Hindu Jats. Moreover, the Hindu Jats 
felt threatened by the increase of Muslim politicians. When the mosque got attacked by Jat mobs, 
many Muslims fled, some with assistance of the army. The violence left the mosque damaged, and 
some houses, shops, and vehicles were burnt down (MAJMA, 2015, p. 65-71). 
 The case study research of the team of MAJMA (2015) clearly shows the differences in the 
individual cases within the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots. Although many different factors were at play in 
these six villages, the relations between the different communities turned out to be of the utmost 
importance to determine whether communal violence did take place or not. As the analysis reveals, the 
presence of both everyday and associational forms of intercommunal engagement, especially in 
villages, increases the likelihood of communal peace. 
Hence, the above analysis finds substantial support for this thesis’ hypothesis: ‘’The stronger the 
intercommunal engagement, the greater is the capacity to withstand the polarising strategies of 
politicians, and the less likely is the occurrence of communal violence’’, and will therefore be adopted. 
5. Conclusion 
This thesis has made the effort to answer the research question: ‘’What effects did intercommunal 
engagement have on the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots?’’ In order to do so, Wilkinson’s (2004) theory of 
electoral incentives is used as a starting point, and Varshney’s (2001 & 2002) theory of civil society as 
the main explanation for the within case variation of the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots. In this study the 
structure of civil society has been linked to the presence or absence of communal violence, in order to 
explain how and why some towns and villages were more prone to polarising strategies of politicians 
than others. The following hypothesis has been formulated: ‘’The stronger the intercommunal 
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engagement, the greater is the capacity to withstand the polarising strategies of politicians, and the less 
likely is the occurrence of communal violence.’’ 
 The main findings to the research question are as follows. Firstly, the decline of associational 
intercommunal engagement between Hindu Jats and Muslims has made the Hindu Jats more 
susceptible to the polarising strategies of politicians. Due to the relative socio-economic successes of 
the Muslim community in recent years, the Muslims became less dependent on their unequal 
relationship with the dominant Hindu Jats. As the Muslims asserted more economic and political 
independence, the Hindu Jats felt that this trend threatened their powerful position in the region, and 
consequently became more susceptible to the polarising strategies of the Hindu right-wing Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) in the run-up to the 2014 Indian general elections. Secondly, the villages’ ethnic 
composition and ratio of communities turned out to be of crucial importance. The riots only took place 
in villages with a Hindu Jat majority and a small Muslim minority. This indicates that an unequal ratio 
of communities leads to an unequal relationship between the communities, which therefore 
undermines the likelihood of strong intercommunal engagement. Thirdly, the intracommunal 
engagement among Hindu Jats has played an important role in explaining the within case variation of 
the riots. The presence of strong intracommunal engagement in a village through the influence of the 
Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU), segregation within villages, or close proximity to Hindu Jat 
panchayats, would explain why communal violence did occur in some Hindu Jat dominated villages, 
and not in others. In sum, the presence of both everyday and associational forms of intercommunal 
engagement, especially in villages, makes the likelihood of communal peace greater. The thesis’ 
hypothesis is therefore supported, and hence adopted. 
 However, it is important to note that this study has several weaknesses and limitations. Firstly, 
the available sources and data on the subject were limited. The inconsistency of the data therefore 
complicated the research. Secondly, the reliability and impartiality of the analysed fact-finding reports 
are questionable. Support for observations therefore had to be derived from multiple sources. In order 
to mitigate these weaknesses, a research project focused on the theory of civil society needs to be set 
up, which conducts surveys, interviews, and case studies in the riot-affected areas. This could possibly 
be complemented with a quantitative analysis of the relation between the degree of inter- and 
intracommunal engagement and the likelihood of communal violence. 
 A further suggestion for future research is to look into other alternative explanations for the 
2013 Muzaffarnagar riots, such as the patronage networks of Berenschot (2011), the institutionalised 
riot systems of Brass (1997 & 2003), and in-group policing of Fearon and Laitin (1996). This will help 
to gain deeper insights into the dynamics of Hindu-Muslim violence in contemporary India, which 
might provide some instruments to reduce conflict in ethnically divided societies. 
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